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An error concerning noses 
	
We identify a strategy for getting beliefs from fiction via three 
assumptions: (1) a certain causal generality holds in the fiction, 
and does so because (2) causal generalities in fiction are (with 
noted exceptions) carried over from what the author takes to be 
fact; (3) the author is reliable on this topic, so what the author 
takes to be fact is fact. We do not question (2). While (3) will, in 
particular cases, be doubtful, the strategy is vulnerable more 
generally to the worry that what looks like a causal generality 
may be instead an authorial intervention of a kind from which 
no causal connection can be inferred; in such cases (1) turns 
out to be false though it may seem at first sight to be true. In 
consequence we have extra reason for being careful in forming 
beliefs based on fictions.  
 
Eden WarwickÕs book, Nasology, or hints towards a classification of 
noses, appeared in 1848. Its thesis, that a personÕs character can be 
read from the shape of their nose, was supported by examples taken 
from, among other things, Oliver Twist. DickensÕ Òcorrect observation 
and delineation of characterÓ gave us the Òhawk-noseÓ of Fagin, the 
Òfine Greek noseÓ of Oliver, the snub nose of the Artful Dodger, and so 
on.1  
Warwick was as wrong as one could be in thinking there is a 
connection between nose and character. Our concern is only briefly 
and towards the end with that error and its sinister associations. It is 
mostly with the idea that a theory can find support in fictional cases. 
We say this need be no error. True, if Warwick thought that Fagin, 
Oliver and the Dodger were confirmatory instances of his thesis he 
was mistaken, for there are no such people; they and their 
nonexistent noses are not evidence for anything and fictional stories 
																																																								
1 Warwick 1848, p.176. There are, by modern standards, some unpleasant 
views expressed in the book. 
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about imaginary objects obeying NewtonÕs laws donÕt add to the 
confirmation of Newtonian mechanics.2  
Warwick may not have been offering Fagin, Oliver and the Dodger as 
evidence. He could be understood instead as appealing to the sagacity 
of Dickens, well known, he says, for his Òcorrect observation and 
delineation of characterÓ. His argument would in that case be that 
Oliver Twist shows that Dickens thought there was a connection 
between noses and character, and this provides a reason to believe 
that there is such a connection. 
We need not think of Dickens as testifying, in some unusually indirect 
way, to this connection. He may have had no interest in 
communicating anything about noses to his audience in writing Oliver 
Twist. It might be instead that his belief in the connection (assuming 
he had such a belief) was merely manifested in the way he told his 
story, as DickensÕ belief that London is subject to fogs is manifested in 
the way he writes Bleak House. One does not have to assume that 
Dickens is telling us that London is subject to fogs in order to 
conclude, on reading the fog-bound opening of that novel, that 
Dickens believed that it is subject to fogs. And beliefs that are merely 
manifested can be as compelling and rational sources of our own 
convictions as beliefs clearly attested to. Your friendÕs belief that 
something dangerous is chasing the two of you is manifested in his 
suddenly running away, and you may well come immediately to share 
that belief and run away yourself, though you realise that your friend 
never meant to communicate anything to you through his running.   
Why would we think that Dickens did believe in the connection 
between nose and character? HereÕs a suggestion; in its turn it 
suggests a way that fictions justify change of belief. Dickens places, 
weÕll assume, such an emphasis in his novel on the noses of his 
																																																								
2 There is a lively debate about whether fictional characters exist. If they do 
they are not people. Everyone agrees that there are not and never were any 
such people as Fagin, Oliver and the Dodger.  
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characters as to suggest a connection between their noses and their 
psychological, social and moral traits.3 The effect of this is to make the 
world of the story one in which there is such a connection.4 Now the 
default understanding for causal generalities in fiction is that they 
reflect what is true, or assumed to be true, of the real world.5 Certain 
genres, the supernatural tale for example, institute systematic 
violations of that default. But works like Oliver Twist, presumed to be 
realistic in intent, will be assumed to follow what the author takes to 
be patterns of actual causation.6 A competent reader who perceives 
the connection between nose and character to be part of the causal 
background for Oliver Twist will then assume that this is intended as 
carry-over from the real world and hence as something Dickens 
believed in. If the reader has a degree of confidence in DickensÕ 
judgement on this question then she has a reason to believe in such a 
connection.  
Before moving on we make three brief comments on the idea of 
reasons to believe. First, the reason in question here is pro tanto; the 
reader may have reasons for disbelieving in the connection, and they 
might outweigh the reason for believing it. In what follows reasons are 
																																																								
3 We donÕt find the extreme emphasis on noses in the novel that Warwick 
claims for it but for the sake of the argument weÕll assume his reading is 
correct. From now on, to avoid a confusion between Òcharacter in the storyÓ 
and Òcharacter traitÓ weÕll use Òperson in the storyÓ when we mean character 
in the first sense.  
4 In the literature on imaginative resistance there is a suggestion of limits to 
the authorÕs say so when it comes to what is true in the story they write; 
someone uncomfortable with the idea of a nose/character connection on 
moral grounds might argue that this is something the author canÕt make 
true in the story. However, the most convincing cases of limits to the 
authorÕs say-so seem rather different from this. See Weatherson 2004, where 
this ÒalethicÓ version of the puzzle of imaginative resistance is identified and 
diagnosed; the diagnosis would not apply to the noses/character case.  
5 On what has been called ÒimportationÓ from the real world into stories see 
Gendler 2010: 197-200. 
6 We focus here on causal generalisations but the same thing applies to 
many other kinds of cases, among them arithmetical truths and 
relationships, matters of local custom, the architecture of notable 
landmarks. 
	 4	
always pro tanto reasons. Secondly, they may depend on false and 
indeed unreasonable beliefs; the author might be unreliable and the 
readerÕs confidence in her reliability unfounded. Nonetheless there is a 
sense in which the reader still has a (pro tanto) reason to believe in the 
connection; judging there to be such a connection would be rational in 
the light of her other beliefs. Finally, instead of speaking of reasons to 
believe a propositions it might be better to speak of reasons to raise 
oneÕs credence in the proposition; reasons that speak in favour of a 
proposition donÕt always speak so strongly that they shift us from 
non-belief to belief. But in this discussion it wonÕt hurt to ignore this 
and speak simply of belief. 
Our second comment raises an important issue. It is sometimes not 
sensible to place reliance on the opinions of other. You would be 
wrong to trust the views of the present authors on the future of the 
economy; our opinions are not worth listening to. Many will treat 
DickensÕ views on noses in the same way, feeling that in this area 
credibility requires expertise that Dickens probably did not have. In 
that case WarwickÕs error was to assume too quickly that successful 
writers have insight into far from evident facts about character. He 
would not have been the first person to make that mistake. 
But  itÕs possible that Warwick made a mistake prior to this one, a 
mistake which, if he had noticed it, would have made redundant any 
consideration of DickensÕ reliability. DickensÕ story-telling activity does 
not have to be taken as establishing that, in the world of the story, 
noses are a guide to character.  It may be true that the effect of 
DickensÕ narrative construction is to make readers expect that 
persons in the story with certain kinds of noses will have certain 
kinds of characters and vice versa. But this does not require readers 
to acknowledge it as true in the stories that noses and character are 
thus connected. In a detective story of the conventional kind readers 
expect that it will not be the most likely suspect who has committed 
the crime. In the real world things are different: a detective who 
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thought the evidence against someone was a reason for regarding 
them as innocent would not be long in employment. Is the world of the 
detective story generally one where the connection between evidence 
and guilt (a causal connection if ever there was one) is violated? We 
say not.7 If the world of the story were one where likely suspects are 
almost never guilty, why doesnÕt the detective know that surprising 
fact? What would the world have to be like, epistemically and 
metaphysically, for that to be true? Anyway, detective stories often 
reassure us that the storyÕs world is evidentially just like the real 
world: 
 The next people we eliminate are the Duchess and Mr Clay. 
They were on the front stage in full view of the audience, and 
yards and yards from the rear stage. In a story, of course, it 
would have to be one of these twoÉ (Inness 1937, p.217). 
Still, competent readers of the genre understand that they should be 
wary about assuming the guilt of the likely suspect. They are wary, 
not because they think the world of the story is epistemically odd, but 
because they realise that this is a story where the author has certain 
story-telling intentions which are very likely incompatible with it being 
true in that story that the obvious suspect is guilty. The same holds 
for other cases, including ones where the connection between events, 
if there was one, would be conventional rather than causal. It may be, 
in some loose sense, a convention of western movies of an earlier era 
that bad people wear black hats, but this is a convention of the genre 
and not of the worlds that stories within that genre describe. We are 
not expected to think that the persons of the plot are conforming to 
the convention: If you are bad, wear a black hat. 
 
																																																								
7 There are exceptions, as with the highly self conscious detective stories of 
Edmund Crispin which occasionally suggest that the world of the fiction is a 
fictional world not merely in actuality but according to the story itself.  
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With this in mind we should consider the possibility that the world of 
Oliver Twist is not a world in which nose and character are causally 
connected. Perhaps Dickens manifests an intention, in writing the way 
he does, to make it so that people in his story with certain characters 
will have certain kinds of noses and visa versa, without this having 
any implications for nose and character being causally connected in 
the world of the story. Just to have a label for this sort of intention-
based connection, letÕs say that in this story the connection between 
nose and character is symbolic rather than causal.  
Only if the nose case were causal would Warwick have a reason for 
taking Oliver Twist as support for his view of noses and character. For 
only then would he be entitled to the conclusion that Dickens believed 
in the holding of such a connection in the real world. Challenged, 
Warwick might have justified his conclusion with the following 
argument, where C specifies a connection between nose and 
character: 
(D) Dickens presents C as holding in the world of the story; the world 
of the story mirrors what he takes to be the causal regularities of 
the real world; Dickens is in this respect reliable; so C.  
If the nose case is symbolic and not causal, the first premise is false 
and the inference canÕt get started. 
(D) may have a false initial premise, but plenty of inferences 
structurally similar to it are not deficient in this way and may warrant 
their conclusions. You wonder whether arsenic is a poison and note 
that, in a story, the victim dies of arsenic poisoning. It would take 
special circumstances to persuade us that this was a symbolic case. 
And absent special circumstances, itÕs reasonable also to assume that 
this is carry over from what the author takes to be the real world; if it 
were not, readers in the know would start assuming that the police 
had made a mistake which would then, by the lights of detective story 
conventions, mislead them (the readers) unfairly. ItÕs also reasonable 
to assume that writers of detective stories themselves know what is 
	 7	
widely known about the operations of poisons. It would add to a 
readerÕs rational conviction a bit if the author in question had 
established a track-record of reliability on questions of this kind, but 
thatÕs not essential. Knowing nothing about the author it still may be 
reasonable for me to start from the presumption of reliability as long 
as I am receptive to evidence contradicting that assumption, should 
any emerge. 
We donÕt claim that in these more favourable cases the result is 
always knowledge. When the stranger tells me there is a gas station 
round the next corner I may not acquire knowledge from what is said, 
but I do acquire a reasonable belief and a rational basis for low-stakes 
action. If that is all the detective story gives me concerning poisons it 
does a decent job of doxastic improvement.  
* 
Catherine Elgin suggested an objection to our symbolic construal of 
the guilty-seeming-parties-are-innocent case; the objection might 
generalise to other examples. She says we can reconcile the 
expectation that an unlikely person will have committed the crime 
with the assumption that the world of the story is, like the real world, 
one in which likely suspects are usually guilty, without going outside 
the world of the story and in particular without invoking authorial 
intention. Assume instead that the story is being told to us by its 
narrator partly because its surprising features makes it a story worth 
telling. After all, when someone goes to the trouble of conveying to us 
their recent experience we assume they are doing so partly because 
there is something interesting about that experience.  
Such reasoning accounts, we grant, for certain patterns of expectation 
in stories. North by Northwest begins with an uneventful taxi ride to a 
hotel bar, but viewers by this time expect something interesting and 
unusual to occur. That is not because they assume the world of the 
story to be one where such journeys are often followed by interesting 
and unusual events but because they think the story, to be worth 
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telling, must have some such event occur pretty soon. Other cases, 
including the noses in Oliver Twist, donÕt fit that pattern very 
comfortably. Take stories in which the persons in the plot have names 
indicative of their most salient traits, as with Mr Mortcloak the 
undertaker in Guy Mannering, the charitable Cheerybles in Nicholas 
Nickelby and TrollopÕs Quiverfulls, with their many children? We are 
not to suppose that the world of any of these stories is one in which 
there is a causal connection between name and character. Is the teller 
of the tale understood to be telling the story partly because of the 
unusualness of the names of some of the persons in the plot? That 
seems unlikely. There are, after all, so many other reasons for telling 
the stories involving these persons, and the naming policy seems 
rather obviously a way of signalling authorial intervention. It seem to 
us similarly unlikely that readers are expected to understand that a 
reason the teller of Oliver Twist is telling us his tale is the statistically 
surprising correlation between the noses and the characters of the 
people the teller knows about. 
* 
We have emphasised the difference between symbolic and casual 
interpretations of the connections a story represents, and the different 
implications of those interpretations for change in belief. That is just a 
start; further investigation quickly throws up some complications. It 
may not be easy to tell which kind of interpretation applies in a given 
case, and in a case like Oliver Twist we may want to invoke 
combinations and hybrids. Also, the question of authorial 
motivationÑdid Dickens believe in a causal connection, or did he 
instead intend the relationship symbolically?Ñmay come apart from 
the question how best to interpret the story. WarwickÕs interest is in 
the first question and not the second so he could live with an 
interpretation that gave noses purely symbolic significance, insisting 
only (though we might not agree with him) on the reliability of DickensÕ 
opinion as to the (now interpretively discounted) causal connection. 
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And a decision on that issue might be unavailable because we canÕt 
decide which category the Oliver Twist case was intended to belong to, 
whether it belongs to their intersection, whether there are elements of 
both categories at work with one or both not fully exemplified, or 
whether category membership in this case is indeterminate because of 
lack of determinacy in DickensÕ own motivation.  
Nor will the kinds of reasoning that tell in favour of a symbolic or a 
causal interpretation be invariant across cases. Perhaps character-
indicating names and noses invite different treatments. After all, 
names are conventional items and noses are not, making it easier and 
more natural to see the second as causally embedded in the storyÕs 
world than it is to see the first in that way. And even if the role of the 
nose/character connection is predominantly to be seen in symbolic 
terms, it may be that the desired effect on an audienceÑheightening 
approval/disapproval of certain persons in the plotÑworks only 
because readers really believe in, or give some credence to, or at least 
gravitate towards the idea that nose and character are connected in 
realityÑsomething many of DickensÕ intended readers and indeed 
some more recent ones probably did. In that case the symbolic import 
of the connection would be supported by at least the shadow of 
causation. Nor will an assurance that the connection is wholly 
symbolic automatically neutralise concerns about the workÕs 
encouragement to readers to ÒexportÓ potentially harmful generalities 
like this one from fictions to the world; work on heuristics and biases 
suggests that peopleÕs beliefs are influenced by vivid though 
unrepresentative instances that easily come to mind (Volvos are 
dangerous; I saw one in an accident yesterday), and that this is so 
even when the instance is explicitly fictional.8 This connection might 
																																																								
8 As Kahneman and Tversky assumed in early work on biases and heuristics 
(1973). For confirmation see Green & Brock 2000: subjects show increased 
confidence in the idea that psychiatric patients present a danger to the 
public as a result of hearing a story about the crime of an unrestrained 
psychiatric patient; the effect was not mitigated by subjects being told that 
the story is fictional.   
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be mitigated by a lively awareness of the causal/symbolic distinction 
and a conviction that the case in hand lies on the symbolic side of the 
dichotomy but all the evidence suggests that once an idea gets into 
our heads it is hard to dislodge. But the difficulties, described above, 
of deciding such cases, together with a presumably widespread 
unawareness of or lack of interest in the distinction itself makes for 
pessimism about the degree of mitigation we can expect.  Perhaps all 
we can ask is that those who want to argue from what is true in a 
fiction to what is true keep the distinction clearly in mind.  
 
Conclusion	
Common experience as well as experimental evidence shows that 
peopleÕs beliefs are affected by their engagements with fictions. They 
are affected not merely by exposure to those occasionally didactic 
passages where assertions are made, but by way of descriptions of 
manifestly imaginary characters and events. What is less clear is 
whether and in what circumstances such changes in belief shift their 
bearers towards reliable belief and away from error. On the face of it, 
fictions are rather perilous epistemic environments, where authors 
regularly say things which are not true, where the overlap between 
what is fictional and what is true must often be guessed at, where 
authors show signs, often ambiguous ones, of believing propositions 
without being clearly committed to them and without our having any 
reasons to treat those beliefs as reliable.  
To all this we add a further uncertainty: much of what we take 
ourselves to be learning from fiction gains doxastic traction because 
we take it that something is true according to the story, and the best 
explanation for it being true according to the story is that the author 
believes it to be true. We have seen that such inferences need to be 
treated with care, because what appears to be a truth-according-to-
the-story may be in fact the result of a direct authorial intervention 
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which supports no inference as to what is the case in the world of the 
story.  
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